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Summary
This report analyzes the prospects for rebuilding an inclusive Iraqi security force
that transcends Iraq’s various ethnic and sectarian communities. U.S. policymakers and
Iraqi officials aim to create a unified Iraqi security force; however, the predominately
Sunni Arab insurgency has hampered this effort, and many believe that the new Iraqi
security agencies will ultimately be composed of mostly Shiite and Kurdish recruits with
the Kurds also separately maintaining their own militias.  As Iraqi officials attempt to
build a pluralistic political system in the aftermath of successful parliamentary elections,
an important challenge will be rebuilding an inclusive Iraqi security force that does not
exacerbate relations between Iraq’s ethnic/religious communities and increase the
likelihood of civil war. Through past supplemental appropriations, Congress has funded
the training and equipping of the new Iraqi security forces.  The FY2005 supplemental
spending request seeks $5.7 billion to train the Iraqi security forces. For more
information on Iraq, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and
Post-Saddam Governance and CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in
Reconstruction Assistance. This report will be updated regularly. 
Introduction
The Bush Administration has deemed the rapid creation of an effective Iraqi fighting
force as key to stabilizing Iraq and expediting the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces. The
FY2005 supplemental spending request seeks $5.7 billion to train the Iraqi security forces.
The rationale for this effort is that a well-trained, well-equipped Iraqi army can be
effective in quelling the insurgency and can help smooth the process of restoring full
sovereignty to a new Iraqi government. U.S. policymakers envision the new Iraqi security
forces to be representative of Iraqi society at large.  A goal is for the new Iraqi army to
transcend Iraq’s religious and ethnic boundaries and keep the country unified while
fighting an insurgency. 
However, there is concern that the ethnic-sectarian nature of the burgeoning
insurgency is undermining U.S. and Iraqi efforts to create a unified Iraqi security force
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that can prevent internal insurgent violence from metastasizing into a larger Iraqi civil war
among Sunnis and Iraqi Shiites and Kurds. With violence unabated in various parts of
Iraq, there has been considerable emphasis on recruiting, training, and equipping Iraqi
soldiers and policemen, but substantially less attention on the future ethnic/religious
makeup of various Iraqi security entities. 
H.R. 1268, the House FY2005 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations bill (passed
the House on March 16, 2005), provides $5.7 billion for an Iraq Security Forces Fund.
The $5.7 billion would be divided among the front line security forces ($3.1 billion),
police and other forces ($1.5 billion), support forces ($810 million), quick response
funding ($180 million), and institutional training ($104 million).
Background
Since its creation at the hands of the British in 1921, the Iraqi army has  never been
able to effectively integrate the country’s Arabs and Kurds, as the army has traditionally
been a strong institution and a source of pride among many Iraqi Sunni and some Shiite
Arabs. Sunni Arab officers, who had served in both the Ottoman Empire and the Arab
revolt against that empire in World War I, formed the core of the nascent army, which was
primarily designed to be an internal security force with little or no ability to project power
beyond Iraq’s borders. During the British mandate (1920-1932), the British effectively
controlled the Iraqi army, but curbed its expansion by relying on British air power and an
ethnically/religiously-based unit known as the Assyrian levies, which was controlled by
the Ministry of the Interior and was used as a bulwark against Turkish meddling in the
north and as a counter-insurgency force against rebellious segments of Iraqi society such
as the Shiites and Kurds. 
After Iraq obtained full independence in 1932, its Sunni army officers became
outwardly more politicized, culminating in the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 by
Major General Abdul-Karim Qassim. Sunnis continued to dominate the officer corps of
the Iraqi army and, by the early 1960s, Sunnis composed 70% of all officers in the Iraqi
army (of whom 45% hailed from Mosul), with Shiites making up 20% and Kurds and
other minorities 10%.1 Relations between Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish officers were tense,
due to repeated Kurdish revolts in northern Iraq and institutional discrimination against
Shiites within the army.  
Saddam Hussein, who himself had no formal military training, purged the army of
anyone considered to be a potential threat to him and to the Baath party.  He created a
number of overlapping security agencies and filled them with members of his immediate
family and larger tribe. Saddam largely ignored the regular Iraqi army, with the exception
of the elite Republican Guard units,  as power within his regime was based largely on his
special security agencies which kept close tabs on Iraqi officers. Saddam continued the
practice of relegating Shiites to low level positions and to conscripts within the regular
army. Shiites took a disproportionate amount of casualties on the front lines of the Iran-
Iraq War in the 1980’s. Ultimately, like other brutal dictators, Saddam’s preference for
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loyal internal security forces and elite military units succeeded in preventing regular army
units from attempting to overthrow the regime. 
Disbanding the Iraqi Army. Historians will most likely continue to debate the
U.S. decision to disband the Iraqi army in May 2003. Many critics point to that decision
(Order #2 -Dissolution of Entities) as the single most important factor in destabilizing Iraq
after the cessation of large scale military operations. Although observers expected U.S.
officials to prohibit the upper echelon of Saddam’s security forces from rejoining the
army, the initial decision to exclude regular army officers and conscripts surprised many
analysts who had argued for the Administration to distinguish between Saddam’s
privileged inner core and the largely neglected regular army. Ambassador L. Paul Bremer
III, former head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), defended the policy, noting
the role the decree had in reassuring the Kurds that the CPA was serious about creating
a united Iraq and convincing them not to secede.2
Current U.S. Training Efforts
U.S. policy has been focused on rapidly preparing Iraqi forces to take over security
responsibilities in order to expedite the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. The Multi-
National Security Training Command - Iraq (MNSTC) has been charged with training
Iraqi security personnel. MNSTC is headed by Army Lieutenant General David H.
Petraeus, who commanded the 101st Airborne Division in northern Iraq during Operation
Iraqi Freedom and was sent back to improve the performance of the Iraqi security forces.
Iraq’s new security agencies range in size and capability (see table below).
Table 1.  Iraqi Ministry of Defense 
(trained and equipped as of March 2005)
Armed Forces Component # of Weeks in Training Estimated # of trained battalions
Iraqi Army (59,880) Regular Army 8 weeks 12
Intervention Forces 13 weeks basic and specialized 12
Special Operations 17 specialized training 2
National Guard 7 weeks 50
Presidential Brigade n/a n/a
Air Force (186) 1-6 months n/a
Navy  (517) 8-12 weeks n/a
60,853 Total 76 estimated
Source: State Department Iraq Weekly Status Report as of 03/08/2005, Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS).
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Table 2.  Iraqi Ministry of the Interior
( trained and equipped as of March 2005)
Security Service Component # of Weeks in Training
Police (55,015*) Regular Police 3-8 weeks
Provincial Police n/a
Highway Patrol 11 weeks
Other (26,874) Emergency response 8 weeks specialized training 
Dignitary protection 6 weeks
Special Police Commandos 3 weeks specialized training 
Civil Intervention 5 weeks specialized training 
Customs/ Border Patrol 4 weeks specialized training 
Total 82,072
Source: State Department Iraq Weekly Status Report as of 03/08/2005, Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS).
* Includes unauthorized absences personnel.
Many analysts and some Members of Congress have challenged Administration
claims of over 140,000 trained Iraqi troops. Critics note that the majority of these forces
are poorly trained national guardsmen or police, who do not count as a military force, and
that as few as 7,000-11,000 Iraqi troops are capable of directly confronting the insurgents.
According to Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), “only some elements of the army, a few elements of the national guard, and the
special security forces can take on insurgents in offensive operations with U.S. support.”3
Other U.S. military officials have acknowledged that the quality and extent of training
varies for each individual Iraqi soldier or policeman. Many observers note that General
Petraeus  has had to balance the need to give new Iraqi recruits more time for training
with the urgency to deploy Iraqi troops on the ground. General Petraeus has largely been
credited with expediting the establishment of over 45 advisor and support teams, who
consist of U.S. and multinational personnel attached to Iraqi units. Most Iraqi security
force units still suffer from equipment shortages.  Items in short supply include armored
vehicles, heavy weapons, personnel armor, and communications equipment. 
Prospects for a Unified Iraqi Army
As stated earlier, the effort to create a unified Iraqi security force mirrors and
depends on Iraqi politicians’ efforts to create a pluralistic political system that is
representative of all of Iraq’s ethnic and religious communities. The Sunni-character of
the insurgency has hindered efforts both at the political and military levels, though some
analysts caution against describing the situation as a burgeoning civil war.  Other analysts
believe that while the numerical strength of the Sunni insurgency may be small, the
perception of a sectarian civil war could become a reality unless Sunnis are integrated into
the Iraqi security forces in a significant way. 
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While no exact breakdown of Iraqi recruits by religious/ethnic group has been cited
in public sources, U.S. commanders have sought to create a security force that is roughly
proportional to Iraq’s various sectarian communities. Some analysts note that some
Sunnis have joined the armed forces out of economic necessity, but Sunni desertion rates
remain particularly high. Others believe that Sunni-Shiite tensions within the Iraqi armed
forces have been exaggerated and that the more significant question of integration
concerns Iraqi Arabs and Kurds. According to Army Capt. Timothy Jeffers, a military
spokesman for the U.S. training mission in Iraq, “in the future, the Iraqi Ministry of
Defense hopes to have a better grasp of this important cultural information on a workable
database.”4
On the one hand, U.S. officials have downplayed sectarian differences in the Iraqi
security forces. When asked for a religious and ethnic breakdown of Iraq’s security forces,
General Petraeus stated that “first of all, I don’t have a breakdown like that.  We don’t
keep one... regional forces, both local police and, again, the Iraqi National Guard most
prominent in that category tend to reflect the ethnic makeup of their community. We have
no reason to question the loyalty of the forces that are out there wearing the Iraqi flag on
their right shoulder, frankly.”5
On the other hand, according to press reports and to some observers, the combination
of the Sunni character of the insurgency in conjunction with the poorer quality of the
Sunni and Shiite recruits have forced U.S. and Iraqi officials to rely heavily on the
Kurdish components of the security forces. In the summer of 2004, General Amar Bakir
al-Hashimi, a Sunni general in Saddam Hussein’s army and the first chief of staff in the
new Iraqi army, was fired after insurgents allegedly got key intelligence from one of his
staff and used it to assassinate a high-ranking officer.6 He was replaced by a Kurdish
general. According to U.S. military officials, Kurdish soldiers, due to the strength and
experience  of their militias or peshmerga, are better trained and more highly committed
than other Iraqi recruits including those Shiites who had served in their own militias.
Insurgent attacks against recruiting stations in Mosul also severely limited U.S. and Iraqi
efforts to incorporate Sunnis from northern Iraq into the armed forces, making the Iraqi
army even more dependent on Kurds serving in northern Iraq.  In a recent NewYorker
article, former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi was told by one Iraqi tribal leader that “in
Mosul, we would prefer any forces, Americans or British - anybody but the Kurds.  The
occupation in Mosul is Kurdish.”7 
Many observers question whether Kurds can ultimately be fully integrated into the
Iraqi security forces if Kurdish leaders insist on retaining their own militias.  Some
military analysts note that Kurdish recruits are more loyal to their tribal and political party
leaders than they are to the central government in Baghdad, calling into question the
viability of a single unified Iraqi army.  The combination of a long history of Kurdish-
Arab conflict, the use of chemical weapons against Kurdish villages between 1988-1990,
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and Kurdish desires for autonomy may have produced a strong antipathy among Kurdish
politicians for a strong, centralized military force in Iraq.  According to one Kurdish
leader, “It’s not in our interests to have a strong Iraqi army, whether it has Kurds in it or
not.”8 According to Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party, one of the
two main Kurdish parties, “We want to keep our peshmerga because they are a symbol
of resistance...it’s not a matter to be discussed or negotiated.”9 Other analysts note that
Kurdish soldiers are most likely to serve in northern Iraq and are reluctant to be publicly
identified as taking a major military role against Iraqi Sunni Arabs. According to Fareed
Asasard, the director of the Kurdistan Strategic Studies Center, “don’t think that because
the peshmerga succeeded in Mosul, they know Anbar [province]... I don’t think they
would be successful in Fallujah or Ramadi. Personally, I have never seen Samarra or
Ramadi or Fallujah — but I have seen Mosul.”10 
Varying Degrees of Integration.  Many military experts who have served in Iraq
assert that while the overall goal of U.S. and Iraqi policymakers is to create a unified Iraqi
fighting force, ethnic/religious cohesiveness can be desirable at certain operating levels.
Many Iraqi national guard units serve in areas close to their homes, which may help build
trust and confidence between Iraqi forces and local communities, but also may make them
and their families vulnerable to intimidation and kidnaping by insurgents.  One recent
press report noted that the Iraqi 305th battalion, or “Tiger Battalion”, was composed of
90% Shiite recruits, who displayed pasted-up images of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani
on the backs of their pickup trucks while serving in Baghdad.11 Other military analysts
note that U.S. commanders have had to ensure that mixed Arab and Kurdish battalions
are sufficiently staffed with Kurdish officers due to the kinship bonds and trust Kurdish
soldiers have for their fellow Kurds serving in the military.
Irregular Units.  In an effort to combat the insurgency and increase the number of
Iraqi forces serving in the field, Iraqi and U.S. officials have begun allowing “irregular
units,”or military units composed of soldiers loyal to a particular commander or
tribal/religious group, to operate in the field independent of the regular Iraqi security
forces. Some estimates place the number of soldiers in these units at 15,000, with  some
brigades charged with protecting Shiite shrines, while others, such as the “Special Police
Commandos,” follow the personal orders of top Iraqi officials. The existence of these
units has challenged U.S. officials who are torn between respecting the policies of the
Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior and preventing the emergence of independent
militias who operate beyond the control of the central government. According to General
Petraeus, “There is a tension between on the one hand encouraging and fostering initiative
and on the other executing the plan for the Iraqi Security Forces that everyone agreed
on...to be candid, I would err on the side of fostering initiative. I want to get the hell out
of here.”12
